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The Impact of Counsel: 
An Analysis of Empirical Evidence 
Rebecca L. Sandefur1 
INTRODUCTION 
In this article, I provide three lenses on empirical evidence about the 
American public’s experience with civil justice problems: the depth of 
public experience, the scope of public experience, and the impact of counsel 
on public experience. The analysis of empirical evidence reveals a 
fundamental problem with traditional U.S. thinking and policy concerning 
access to justice: both are too narrowly focused on law and formal legal 
institutions. To move forward, we need both new understanding and new 
policies. New understanding comes from viewing justice problems from the 
public’s perspective. New policies should include providing effective, 
accessible, nonlegal routes to solutions for common and significant civil 
justice problems; these routes will be a necessary complement to the 
traditional solution of more access to law. 
The first two sections of this paper assess empirical evidence about how 
frequently Americans encounter civil justice problems and how these 
problems affect them and society at large. Millions of Americans are 
currently experiencing significant civil justice problems.2 Such troubles are 
common and widespread, and their impact both on the people who 
experience them and the public as a whole can be deep and long lasting.3 
This article’s third section reviews evidence about how lawyers affect 
public experience with civil justice problems, focusing particularly on how 
lawyer representation changes the outcomes of adjudicated civil cases. Most 
Americans’ civil justice problems are never taken to lawyers for advice nor 
are they pursued in courts or tribunals.4 When justice problems do become 
cases that are adjudicated, many people appear without attorneys.5 When 
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people are represented by attorneys, they are, on average, more likely to win 
in adjudication than are people who are unrepresented.6 But how much 
more likely varies greatly; the observed difference in case outcomes 
between attorney-represented and unrepresented members of the public 
varies widely across different kinds of civil justice problems and different 
studies of lawyers’ impact.7 One factor that seems to shape variation in the 
magnitude of lawyers’ impact is procedural complexity—the complexity of 
the documents and procedures necessary to pursue a justice problem as a 
court case appears to account for some of lawyers’ effect on case 
outcomes.8 
Taken together, these findings support some traditional calls for reform, 
but they also suggest innovative avenues through which the United States 
might expand access to justice. Observers have advocated perennially for 
greater access to law—more access to counsel and simplified procedures 
that would allow ordinary people to pursue civil cases without legal 
representation. These traditional routes to expanding access to justice are 
clearly indicated. However, they will not go far enough. The solution is not 
more of the same; it is, rather, something new entirely. Our typical ways of 
conceptualizing people’s experiences with civil justice problems focus too 
narrowly on law. Stepping back to look at the whole canvas of public 
experience with civil justice problems reveals that we need not merely 
additional access to law, but also more creativity in thinking about access to 
justice. 
I. THE DEPTH OF CIVIL JUSTICE PROBLEMS’ IMPACT 
For many members of the American public, civil justice problems emerge 
“at the intersection of civil law and everyday adversity.”9 These problems 
can involve family relationships, work, money, insurance, pensions, wages, 
benefits, housing, and property—to name just a few areas of contemporary 
life. Though these different types of problems affect different aspects of 
peoples’ lives and concern different kinds of relationships, they share a 
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certain important quality: they are problems that have civil legal aspects, 
raise civil legal issues, and have consequences shaped by civil law, even 
though the people who experience them may never think of them as “legal” 
and may never attempt to use law to try to resolve them.10 Such problems 
are both common, as I will describe in the next section,11 and impactful, as I 
illustrate in this one. 
A clear image of the depth of impact of civil justice problems is provided 
by allowing members of the public to speak for themselves about their own 
experiences. I tell a single story here, but it represents many. It comes from 
a series of focus groups that I conducted in two midsize cities in the 
Midwestern region of the United States during the autumns of 2005 and 
2007. Participants in these groups were randomly selected to be invited to 
spend a couple of hours on a weeknight in a library or community center 
meeting room to discuss “problems facing American families today.” The 
first exercise in the focus groups was to go around the room and ask each 
person to tell a story about a problem that he or she had experienced in any 
of a variety of different arenas including with housing, finances, bills, child 
support, divorce, and the like. The focus group facilitator and I made no 
mention of the fact that the study was about civil justice problems or law; 
we simply asked people to tell us about problems they were having.12 
Countless aspects of life in contemporary market democracies are shaped 
by civil law, so it will come as no surprise that a substantial proportion of 
everyday problems that people in the focus groups described were civil 
justice problems.13 By this, I do not mean that people thought of these 
problems as “legal” problems—they typically did not—nor that these 
problems were necessarily best resolved through law. Rather, these 
problems raised civil legal issues, had civil legal aspects, and had 
consequences shaped by civil law, as the story I am about to recount 
illustrates. 
This account was related by a woman in her mid-thirties. Though she 
earned too much to meet the means-tested requirements for Legal Services 
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Corporation (LSC)-funded civil legal aid (an income less than 125 percent 
of the federal poverty level), her family’s income was still low in relative 
terms—less than 80 percent of her county’s median income.14 As we sat in 
plastic chairs around a slightly sticky table in the small community center’s 
classroom, drinking soda and eating cheese crackers and oatmeal cookies, 
this is the story that she told: 
About five years ago, I used to pay insurance. I used to pay about 
$300 of insurance for my kids and then my kids weren’t going to 
the doctor, so I decided I was going to take them off insurance and 
go on [Community Care, her state’s insurance program for low-
income children]. Well, right as I almost qualified for [Community 
Care], my thirteen-year-old got killed. So then, he didn’t have no 
health insurance and neither did my fifteen-year old, who also got 
shot. 
So then that leads back down here to collections and [the hospital] 
wants me to pay for it. And I keep telling them, “I’m not paying 
for that.” So they want me to get a loan so that I can pay for it. So 
what I did was go back to the district attorney’s office and see if 
the people who killed my son, pay for it. But since they’re in 
prison, it’s going to be on my credit forever. So that causes me a 
lot of pain because I can’t even look at buying a house. Because 
they want me to pay for it and wait until the money trickles, you 
know, from here to thirty years. . . . 
This is a particularly tragic account of experience with civil justice 
problems. It is not unique, however. As with many situations people 
described in the focus groups, here, an initial problem triggered a series of 
problems that would affect the lives of those involved for many years to 
come. Significant civil justice problems and the consequences they create 
are neither exceptional nor unusual.15 Civil justice problems can have a 
wide-ranging and deep impact, not only on the people who experience 
them, but also on the societies in which these people live, both as illustrated 
above and as documented in research based on large, national population 
surveys. 
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Scholars working with the England and Wales Civil and Social Justice 
Surveys have found that people’s experiences with civil justice problems 
can lead to physical health problems, mental health problems, the 
breakdown of family relationships, loss of housing, lost employment, and 
lost income—among other adverse consequences.16 An initial civil justice 
problem can thus cascade into a shower of problems, some related to civil 
law and others not.17 
The impact of civil justice problems is borne not only by the people who 
experience them but also by society at large. Research in the United 
Kingdom reveals that the adverse health consequences of civil justice 
problems can lead to increased public expenditures on the provision of 
medical services.18 It also shows that lost employment as a consequence of 
civil justice problems can lead to increased expenditures on public 
benefits.19 It further documents that, while some people who lose their 
housing as a result of civil justice problems are able to find new shelter, 
others are not and so must stay in temporary accommodation, some of 
which is publicly subsidized and, thus, represents an additional public 
expense.20 
As other research shows, the costs are not solely fiscal in nature. A study 
drawing on a recent Canadian survey of public experience with civil justice 
problems finds that “[t]he mere fact of experiencing” a civil justice 
problem—whether or not the problem involves contact with the law or the 
justice system—is “related to the view that the law and the justice system 
are unfair.”21 This sense of unfairness appears to be exacerbated when 
justice problems go unresolved.22 These deep and wide-ranging 
consequences flow from civil justice problems that are quite common in 
contemporary America. 
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II. THE SCOPE OF PUBLIC EXPERIENCE WITH CIVIL JUSTICE 
PROBLEMS 
The United States’ more than three hundred million people23 experience 
many problems that have civil legal aspects and raise civil legal issues.24 
Here, and in other western market democracies, these problems are so 
common as to be “nearly normal features of everyday life.”25 The best 
estimates available for the scope of the American public’s experience with 
civil justice problems are based on information that was collected long 
before the recent recession. In fact, the most recent survey of the population 
is from 1992, and it provides information representing the experiences of 
only a portion of the American public.26 This 1992 survey is not 
comprehensive, as it excludes one-fifth of the population, the highest-
earning 20 percent of households.27 The last truly comprehensive surveys of 
public experience with civil justice problems are more than three decades 
out of date, conducted in the 1970s.28 
Like most contemporary civil justice surveys, the 1992 survey presented 
respondents with lists of specific problems, each carefully selected to be 
problems that raised issues in civil law, and then asked whether respondents 
had experienced each during a specified period of time before the survey—
in this case, one year.29 General categories queried included those involving 
family, work, benefits, housing, debt, credit, and neighborhood problems. 
Specific problems included events like “not having money to pay bills,”30 
“serious dispute with tax people,”31 “had difficulty collecting pay,”32 and 
“separation, divorce, or annulment.”33 
The 1992 U.S. survey revealed that about half of surveyed households 
had been experiencing at least one serious civil justice problem in the 
twelve months prior to the survey.34 If one project forward that rate of 
problems experienced to today, the projection implies that more than forty-
four million households (in which live more than one hundred million 
people) are experiencing at least one nontrivial civil justice problem.35 
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One hundred million people affected each year may seem staggeringly 
large—it is on the order of one-third of the U.S. population—but it is in fact 
a conservative estimate for the scope of the American public’s experience 
with civil justice problems. More than one hundred million people are 
estimated to live in households with incomes of less than $90,000 a year 
and are experiencing at least one civil justice problem—this excludes the 
justice problems experienced by the rest of the population, the additional 
90.9 million people who live in households with incomes of $90,000 per 
year or more.36 
But one hundred million affected each year is a conservative estimate, 
even for the justice problems of the low- and moderate-income public. The 
current recession will likely have increased the number of people 
experiencing hardships like foreclosure,37 job loss,38 trouble paying medical 
bills,39 difficulties with consumer debt,40 and eviction41—all of which can 
produce civil justice problems or be civil justice problems in and of 
themselves.42 In addition, the survey techniques used in the 1992 national 
study may lead to underestimates of how often people experience different 
kinds of justice problems. Traditional surveys typically use the past twelve 
months to five years as their frame of reference when asking people to 
report on their justice problems.43 Some scholars argue that the 
retrospective focus of such studies leads to underreporting because people 
fail to remember or report all the problems that they have experienced in the 
past.44 A recent study estimates that these kinds of surveys may understate 
the incidence of civil justice problems by a factor of as much as two-
thirds.45 We can conclude, therefore, that the American public faces a 
substantial volume of civil justice problems—probably many more 
problems than suggested by the most recent U.S. civil justice survey. 
Under any expansion of access to legal services, whether as a right or 
through other means, only some of these more than one hundred million 
people living with civil justice problems would likely be eligible for 
publicly subsidized legal advice or lawyer representation. The current 
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means test for LSC-funded legal services is an annual household income of 
no more than 125 percent of the federal poverty level. For a family of four 
in 2008, this threshold would have been an income less than about 
$27,530.46 As Figure 1 demonstrates, in 2008 there were more than 53.8 
million people living in households eligible by this means test. Based on 
projections from the 1992 survey, an estimated 25.3 million people eligible 
for LSC-funded services were living in households experiencing at least one 
civil justice problem. Some contemporary proposals would extend a 
government subsidy for access to lawyers’ services farther along the 
household income distribution, up to 200 percent of poverty.47 For a family 
of four in 2008, that threshold would have been a household income of 
around $44,050.48 If implemented as a national means test, the 200 percent 
of poverty standard would imply a projected more than 96.3 million people 
living in households eligible for subsidized civil legal services, an estimated 
47.4 million of whom would be living in households experiencing at least 
one civil justice problem. 
Figure 1. Estimated Numbers of People Eligible for Civil Legal Aid and 
Living with Civil Justice Problems, by Means-Tested Household 
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For the more than ninety-six million people living in households with 
incomes below 200 percent of poverty in 2008, these conservative, pre-
recession estimates of experience with civil justice problems imply, for 
example: 
 12 million people living in households experiencing at least one 
civil justice problem related to livelihood (whether from 
employment, pensions, or public benefits), including discrimination, 
problems with wages or pensions, and problems with working 
conditions; 
 9.9 million people living in households experiencing at least one 
civil justice problem involving family or domestic situations, 
including problems involving divorce, elder abuse, domestic 
violence, or child support; and 
 16.4 million people living in households experiencing at least one 
civil justice problem involving personal finances, including 
problems with insurance, taxes, debt, and credit.49 
III. LAWYERS’ IMPACT ON PUBLIC EXPERIENCE WITH CIVIL JUSTICE 
PROBLEMS 
As these estimates suggest, civil justice problems are so common as to be 
“features of everyday life” in contemporary U.S. society.50 And, while such 
problems are very common, legal responses to them are not. Turning to law 
is not Americans’ usual reaction to their civil justice problems.51 In this 
respect, Americans are similar to residents of most other contemporary 
developed nations: “Although studies reveal that different societies provide 
diverse routes for resolving civil justice problems, they also reveal that the 
majority of problems never make it to law, lawyers, or the civil justice 
system.”52 
Despite representations in the media that would imply otherwise,53 
Americans typically do not find legal remedies to their civil justice 
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problems. Forty years of civil justice surveys reveal that the vast majority of 
civil justice problems are never taken either to lawyers or to a court or other 
hearing body.54 Most civil justice problems do not involve advice from an 
attorney.55 The 1992 national survey of the American public’s experience 
with civil justice problems found that 24 percent of problems involved 
consulting an attorney.56 Such a consultation did not necessarily involve the 
receipt of legal services; in some instances, it went no further than a 
discussion about whether or not the attorney would take the case.57 Earlier 
U.S. studies found similarly low rates of consultation with lawyers for help 
with civil justice problems,58 and more recent state-level civil justice 
surveys focused on low-income populations also found low rates of lawyer 
consultation for civil justice problems.59 
Most civil justice problems are not adjudicated in front of hearing bodies. 
According to the 1992 survey, only 14 percent of civil justice problems 
were taken to a court or hearing body.60 Certain kinds of civil justice 
problems are more likely than others to lead to contact with courts or 
tribunals. For example, the 1992 survey found that 37 percent of family and 
domestic problems involved a court or hearing body, while 12 percent of 
employment-related problems and 11 percent of civil justice problems 
involving personal finances involved courts or other hearing bodies.61 
Notwithstanding this variation in the kinds of problems more and less likely 
to be taken to lawyers or heard in courts, most of the public’s civil justice 
problems do not make it to the formal legal system. 
When members of the public do seek resolution from a court or tribunal, 
they often appear as self-represented litigants. National statistics regarding 
self-representation do not exist, but studies in individual jurisdictions 
suggest that a majority of certain types of cases—including family and 
domestic cases and unlawful detainer disputes—involve at least one self-
represented litigant.62 Some states report that as many as 90 percent of 
certain kinds of cases involve at least one self-represented litigant.63 
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A. Public Experience with Civil Justice Problems and a Right to Counsel 
Arguments for a right to counsel in civil matters have often centered on 
precisely this issue: that many members of the lay public who appear in 
civil hearings and trials do so without the representation of a lawyer.64 
Implied in this rationale is the belief that the presence of lawyers changes 
something important. For example, in the absence of lawyer representation, 
meritorious cases might nevertheless lose when presented by people who do 
not know how to communicate those merits effectively by using the terms 
and the means that courts and judges understand. In addition, attorneys may 
provide an advantage in litigation that is independent from the merits of a 
case. To the extent that courts treat the unsophisticated or inexperienced 
litigants who self-represent as equivalent to litigants who are represented by 
attorneys, attorney-represented litigants who square off against self-
represented litigants may benefit from the sheer imbalance of 
representation. As Mark Galanter famously argued in his analysis of “why 
the ‘haves’ come out ahead,” the ability to hire attorneys is one of the 
advantages enjoyed by the “haves” that—regardless of the rightness of their 
cause—permit them to prevail more often than the “have nots.”65 In this 
understanding, a right to counsel would be a move toward a basic equality 
of arms.66 
Yet, only a modest amount of research effort has gone into investigating 
the question of how lawyers change what happens in courtrooms, perhaps 
because the claim that they do so seems self-evident to many observers. 
Over the past half century, a few dozen published67 studies have empirically 
investigated the relationship between lawyer representation and what 
happens in adjudicated civil cases. These studies typically inquire into 
whether, and sometimes how, the presence of attorneys changes the 
outcomes of civil trials and hearings. By reviewing these studies together, 
one can gain new information about lawyers’ impact on public experience 
with civil justice problems. 
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B. Empirical Evidence about Lawyer Representation and Public Experience 
with Civil Justice Problems 
My review of the evidence examines a very specific component of 
lawyers’ impact: how much lawyer representation changes the outcomes of 
formal adjudication. This impact, of course, does not comprise all that 
lawyers do. Among other work, attorneys advise, counsel, and negotiate; 
they identify, cultivate, and pursue test and impact cases; they control 
access to law by screening cases for representation or not; they organize 
small claims that would go unattended into large classes that become the 
object of legal action and public scrutiny; and they engage in legislative 
advocacy and grassroots organizing. Nevertheless, a central part of the legal 
profession’s contribution to the public’s access to law and justice is the 
lawyers’ work of advocacy in hearings and trials. 
1. Meta-Analysis 
This review takes the form of a meta-analysis—a quantitative research 
synthesis that uses the findings of extant research to produce a summary of 
general knowledge about a given phenomenon.68 I focus on a single 
empirical question: how much does lawyer representation affect who wins 
and loses in adjudication? My review is agnostic about whether lawyers’ 
work makes the outcomes of adjudication “better” in the sense of making 
them more legally accurate or substantively just. Rather, the inquiry is into 
what we know about whether lawyers make outcomes different than they 
would be in the absence of attorney representation. 
Combining research in a synthetic review requires that the studies be 
comparable in design, and that they report all the information necessary to 
construct quantitative measures of the relationship between lawyer 
representation and case outcomes. Because no impact of counsel research 
canon yet exists in the literature, the various extant studies exhibit little 
consensus about terminology, methodology, or theoretical approach. In 
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conducting the synthetic review, a number of studies had to be excluded for 
reasons of research design or incomplete reporting of results. 
To serve for the meta-analysis, studies had to present quantitative 
summaries of the outcomes of civil contests that were formally 
adjudicated—that is, actually taken to trial and heard—in courts or tribunals 
somewhere in the United States. In order to permit comparisons between 
other-represented and self-represented parties, studies had to include (on at 
least one side of the dispute) parties who could potentially appear 
unrepresented by any agent, i.e., private individuals. In order to provide 
information that could be generalized to the whole population of cases 
heard in a particular kind of forum, the studies had to report on a sample of 
cases that was representative of the population of cases being studied. The 
published reports needed to provide sufficient information to construct 
measures of the number of cases won and lost by the type of representation 
used. In particular, studies had to distinguish between cases represented by 
qualified attorneys and cases represented by other kinds of advocates, such 
as law students or paralegals. I did not exclude studies that distinguished 
between represented and unrepresented parties on only one side of a 
dispute, as this would have eliminated many otherwise eligible studies.  
Twelve studies, comprising more than seventy thousand adjudicated civil 
cases, met the criteria for inclusion. In terms of the kinds of legal problems 
and courts empirically investigated, the studies included in the review 
closely resemble those that were excluded.69 The only exception to this 
resemblance is the exclusion of all studies in family law. Because my 
analysis is of wins and losses, I excluded studies of family cases; as 
observers have noted, “[d]omestic disputes, unlike other civil disputes, are 
difficult to assess regarding winners per se.”70 
Table 1 lists the included studies, the number of cases that contribute to 
the meta-analysis, the kinds of cases they include, and the kind of forum in 
which the cases are heard. As the table reveals, existing studies prominently 
feature areas of classical poverty law, such as administrative hearings about 
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benefits and eviction defense for low-income tenants. But the studies also 
include a range of civil justice problems faced across the population, 
including tax appeals and hearings to contest the special education 
classification of one’s children, as well as problems of employment law, 
including social security disability insurance reconsideration hearings.71 
Two studies investigate asylum requests, each looking separately at two 
types of cases: those where people claim asylum as a defense to deportation 
and those where they seek asylum affirmatively. Two studies investigate 
hearings in small claims courts. Typically, the studies take the perspective 
of a focal party, usually a person facing a business, a landlord, or a 
government agency (such as a tenant facing eviction for nonpayment of 
rent, an “Aid to Families with Dependent Children”72 recipient contesting a 
reduction or termination of benefits, or a person appealing a state tax bill). 
As Table 1 reports, the studies vary in two ways that will turn out to be 
useful in the meta-analysis, as both provide some information about how 
easy or difficult it might be for a lay person to attempt to represent himself 
or herself. As the third column of the table notes, some studies are of 
adjudication in traditional trial courts, while others are in tribunals or small 
claims courts. These latter two kinds of forums often employ relaxed 
evidence rules and sometimes permit a more narrative style of presentation 
than do traditional trial courts. One of the principal purposes of the 
reformers who pushed for these kinds of modified forums was to simplify 
rules and procedures so that lay people could more effectively represent 
themselves.73 To the extent that reformers’ aims were realized, we might 
expect that the advantage of being represented by an attorney is less in 
small claims courts or tribunals than it is in traditional trial courts. 
The final column of the table includes an assessment of how complex the 
documents and procedures are in the field of law that comprises the cases 
included in each study. The measure comes from the 1995 Chicago 
Lawyers Survey, a contemporary study of practicing attorneys, in which 
these attorneys were asked to rate the procedural complexity of their own 
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work.74 In this survey, a random sample of people eligible to practice law 
with offices in Chicago were asked to rate their own practices in terms of 
the degree to which someone without legal training or experience could 
easily understand the documents and procedures used in their work. The 
“procedural complexity measure” is the lawyers’ average rating on a scale 
indicating the extent to which the procedures and documents involved in the 
work required so much specialized skill and knowledge that they could not 
be understood by an educated layperson. Raters are attorneys who reported 
devoting at least 25 percent of their total work time to that field of law. That 
is, for each field of law, the measure is the practitioners’ average response 
to the item below: 
Different kinds of law require different kinds of professional 
activities. [Below are] a series of paired statements that describe 
different demands made on the lawyer. These are presented as 
polar opposites. Please circle the number that best represents your 
position in relation to the two opposites. If the situation in your 
practice is midway between poles, circle code 3; if your situation is 
at one or the other extreme, circle 1 or 5; if your position leans 
somewhat to either pole, circle 2 or 4. 
 
A B 
The type and content of my 
practice is such that even an 
educated layman couldn’t 
really understand or prepare 
the documents 
A para-professional could be 
trained to handle many of the 
procedures and documents in 
my area of law 
 
1   2   3   4   5 
In computing the procedural complexity measure, I reverse coded the 
scale, so that higher ratings indicated greater complexity. I standardized the 
ratings for each field, so that fifty indicates the average score and each ten-
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point change indicates one standard deviation. I classified each study into 
the broad field of law that most closely approximated the cases in the study. 
Looking at the range of procedural complexity ratings, it is readily 
apparent that the studies are centered in fields of law that lawyers regard as 
average or below average relative to the scope of lawyers’ work. Ten 
studies examine lawyers’ impact in trials or hearings involving fields of law 
that lawyers rate as having roughly average complexity (a score of 46 to 
51). Two studies examine lawyers’ impact on the outcomes of trials or 
hearings that involve fields of law that lawyers rate as below average in 
procedural complexity (43 on the procedural complexity scale). This 
restricted range of complexity is an important factor to keep in mind when 
considering the range of case types to which these findings may generalize. 
Some kinds of civil justice problems encountered by people who might be 
eligible for civil legal assistance—such as Medicaid eligibility cases, for 
example—are arguably more complex than many of the kinds of cases 
considered here. In general, whatever the findings about representation and 
case outcomes, we cannot generalize those findings to highly complex 
fields of law, as we have no information about those fields. 
 
Table 1. Studies Contributing Data to the Meta-Analysis: Case Type, 
Study Citation, Number of Cases Contributed, Field of Law, Type of 
Forum, and Procedural Complexity Rating 
 
Type of Case  
(number of cases) 





State tax appeals 
Kritzer, Herbert M. 1998. “The Wisconsin Tax 
Appeals Commission.”  Legal Advocacy: 
Lawyers and Non-lawyers at Work. Ann Arbor, 
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Type of Case  
(number of cases) 






Hammer, Ronald P. and Joseph M. Hartley. 
1978. “Procedural Due Process and the Welfare 
Recipient: A Statistical Study of AFDC Fair 
Hearings in Wisconsin.” Wisconsin Law Review. 
pp 145–251. 
 (1,065 cases) 
 
Cooper, Laura. 1979. “Goldberg’s Forgotten 
Footnote: Is There a Due Process Right to a 
Hearing Prior to the Termination of Welfare 
Benefits When the Only Issue Raised is a 










Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) 
reconsideration hearings 
Subcommittee on Social Security of the 
Committee on Ways and Means. 1975. “Report 
of the Disability Claims Process Task Force.” 
Recent Studies Relevant to the Disability 
Hearings and Appeals Crisis. Washington, DC: 









Fusco, Anthony J., Jr., Nancy B. Collins, and 
Julian R. Birnbaum. 1979. “Chicago’s Eviction 
Court: A Tenants’ Court of No Resort.” Urban 
Law Annual 17:93–132. 
(1,061 cases) 
 
Seron, Carroll, Gregg Van Ryzin, Martin 
Frankel, and Jean Kovath. 2001. “The Impact of 
Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in 
New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a 




Mosier, Marilyn Miller and Richard A. Soble. 
1973–1974. “Modern Legislation, Metropolitan 
Court, Miniscule Results: A Study of Detroit’s 
Landlord-Tenant Court.” University of Michigan 
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Affirmative asylum requests 
Kerwin, Donald. 2004. “Charitable Legal 
Programs for Immigrants: What They Do, Why 
They Matter and How They Can Be Expanded.” 
Immigration Briefings 04–6:1–12. 
(35,760 cases) 
 
Schoenholtz, Andrew I. and Jonathan Jacobs. 
2001. “The State of Asylum Representation: 
Ideas for Change.” Georgetown Immigration 
Law Journal 16(4):739–772. 
(20,696 cases) 
 
Immigration Court 48 
Defensive asylum requests 
(i.e., focal party is facing deportation) 
Kerwin, Donald. 2004. “Charitable Legal 
Programs for Immigrants: What They Do, Why 
They Matter and How They Can Be Expanded.” 
Immigration Briefings 04–6:1–12. 
(5,794 cases) 
 
Scoenholtz, Andrew I. and Jonathan Jacobs. 
2001. “The State of Asylum Representation: 
Ideas for Change.” Georgetown Immigration 
Law Journal 16(4):739–772. 
(2,803 cases) 
 
Immigration Court 48 
Special education certification hearings 
Kirp, David, William Buss, Peter Kuriloff. 
1974. “Legal Reform of Special Education: 
Empirical Studies and Procedural Proposals.” 
California Law Review 62:40–155. 






Small claims consumer cases 
Steadman, John Montague and Richard S. 
Rosenstein. 1972–1973. “‘Small Claims’ 
Consumer Plaintiffs in the Philadelphia 
Municipal Court: An Empirical Study.” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
121:1309–1361. 










Small claims court 
Sarat, Austin. 1976. “Alternatives in Dispute 
Processing: Litigation in a Small Claims Court.” 
Law and Society Review (Spring):337–376. 
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2. The Observed Difference between Lawyer-Represented and 
Unrepresented Parties 
Lawyer-represented people are more likely to prevail than people who 
appear unrepresented, on average. Figure 2 reports for each study the 
difference in likelihood that lawyer-represented people win in comparison 
with the likelihood that unrepresented people win. Here, this difference, 
which I will refer to as the “observed difference” between lawyer-
represented and unrepresented people’s case outcomes, is expressed as an 
odds ratio.75 When an odds ratio equals one, the odds are even: 
unrepresented people have just as good a chance of winning their cases, on 
average, as do lawyer-represented people. Odds ratios less than 1.0 would 
indicate that lawyer-represented people tend to have worse outcomes than 
unrepresented people: the odds of their winning would be lower than the 
odds of unrepresented people winning. Odds ratios greater than 1.0 indicate 
that lawyer-represented people tend to have better outcomes (in terms of 
winning their cases), on average, than do unrepresented people. 
All of the odds ratios for all of the studies are greater than 1.0. As Figure 
2 shows, lawyer-represented people do better—on average, lawyer-
represented people are more likely to win than are unrepresented people in 
every study. But, though this difference consistently indicates that lawyer-
represented parties enjoy better outcomes than do unrepresented parties, just 
how much better varies considerably across studies—from a study where 
lawyer-represented people are 19 percent more likely to win than 
unrepresented people, to studies where lawyer-represented people are three 
or four times more likely to win, to a study which finds that lawyer-
represented people are almost fourteen times (odds ratio = 13.79) more 
likely to win than are unrepresented people. 
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Figure 2. Observed Difference in the Likelihood People Win in 
Adjudication: Lawyer-Represented People Compared to 
Unrepresented People76 
N = 12 studies of 14 case groups, comprising 72,337 cases. 
It is not clear from most existing studies how much of the observed 
difference reflects how lawyers actually change case outcomes and how 
much is due to other factors, such as characteristics of the lay litigants or the 
cases themselves. The kinds of people who seek out and secure 
representation by attorneys may be different from those who do not, and 
these differences may be related to skills or personality traits that would 
make these litigants more successful on their own, even without attorneys. 
For example, they may have greater facility with English, or be more 
organized, more persistent, or better at communicating information to legal 
professionals than litigants who do not seek out attorneys or cannot secure 
representation when they do. We might expect that people with the qualities 
of language facility, organization, persistence, and good communication 
skills would have been more likely to win their cases even without lawyers 
to represent them. Similarly, the kinds of cases that end up being 
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represented by lawyers are likely different from the kinds of cases that do 
not. For example, cases that lawyers take may have more legal merit, more 
easily available evidence, or better facts than cases that lawyers turn away. 
Both of these potential differences—differences in litigant capacity to 
represent themselves, and differences in the likelihood that cases will win 
given the facts and the law—combine with what lawyers actually do in 
litigation to create the differences in case outcomes that we observe 
between lawyer-represented and self-represented people. 
One study avoids this problem of interpretation by employing a 
randomized trial. In this study, people waiting in line at a courthouse to 
respond to a summons for eviction for nonpayment of rent were randomly 
selected to receive lawyer advice and representation or to be told that no 
lawyer was available to assist them at that time. Both groups of people, 
those provided with attorneys as part of the research project and those told 
that they could be offered no assistance, were then followed through to the 
conclusion of their court cases. Because the research design matched 
litigants to the conditions of lawyer representation or no representation 
randomly (without reference to litigant characteristics or aspects of the 
case), the differences observed in the outcomes of lawyer-represented and 
unrepresented people are likely due to the presence of lawyers themselves, 
as the two groups of cases differ in no other systematic way. This 
randomized trial found a difference in the middle of the observed range. In 
this study, tenants facing eviction for nonpayment of rent who were 
represented by lawyers were more than 4.4 times more likely to retain 
possession of their apartments than similar tenants who were not 
represented.77 
3. What Are Lawyers Doing that Creates the Observed Difference? 
Evaluating the Role of Procedural Complexity 
The magnitude of the observed difference varies widely across studies, 
but this variation is patterned in instructive ways. Figure 3 reports on the 
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average observed difference when studies are classified into four categories 
based on the two dimensions of variation introduced in Table 1—procedural 
complexity and type of hearing forum. The quantities in the figure are 
weighted averages, calculated for each study and then weighted within each 
category, so studies that contribute more cases weigh more heavily on the 
average than smaller studies that contribute fewer cases.78 
The first dimension of variation, reflected in the color of the bars, is 
procedural complexity as rated by attorneys who practice in that field of 
law. The fields of law for which lawyers provided complexity ratings in the 
Chicago Lawyers Survey were not always at the same level of detail as the 
fields of law included in the studies of lawyers’ impact. The process of 
classifying the studies into fields thus involves measurement error: in some 
instances, the fields of law for which we have complexity measures are 
much broader than the fields of law represented in the studies (e.g., civil 
litigation for personal clients versus education law, respectively). To the 
extent that this measurement error is random with respect to the variables of 
interest, it serves to reduce observed differences between categories of 
cases—that is, it will make the differences appear smaller than they actually 
are.79 The second dimension of variation is the kind of forum in which the 
dispute is heard: it distinguishes traditional trial courts from small claims 
courts and tribunals. As noted above, these latter types of forum were 
specifically intended to be forums in which lay people could more easily 
pursue their own cases.80 
In the figure, studies in which the field of law is below average in 
procedural complexity, as rated by attorneys, are represented by the darker 
bar; studies in which attorneys rated procedural complexity as average are 
indicated by the lighter bars. The left pair of bars reports the observed 
difference in case outcomes between lawyer-represented and unrepresented 
people in simplified forums (tribunals and small claims courts), while the 
right bar reports the observed difference in traditional trial courts. None of 
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the studies includes cases in fields of law of average complexity that are 
heard in simplified forums.  
The figure reveals a striking finding: the observed difference is much 
greater for cases in those fields of law that lawyers rate as involving greater 
procedural complexity. This is true even when such cases are heard in 
simplified forums such as tribunals and small claims courts. The smallest 
observed difference between lawyer-represented and unrepresented cases is 
found in the two studies of welfare fair hearings, which involve a field of 
law that attorneys rate as less procedurally complex and in which cases are 
heard in a tribunal. In these two studies, focal parties represented by 
attorneys are on average 40 percent more likely to prevail than are focal 
parties who represent themselves. In studies of cases in fields that lawyers 
rate as having average procedural complexity—tax, immigration, 
employment law, landlord/tenant, consumer claims, and general personal 
civil litigation—lawyers’ potential impact is much larger. 
In this body of research, when procedural complexity is greater, the type 
of forum in which the case is heard appears to make little difference. In 
more complex fields of law, the observed difference in outcomes for 
lawyer-represented and unrepresented people is quite large, depending on 
whether the cases are heard in a court or in a simplified forum (like a 
tribunal or small claims court). In fields of average complexity in trial 
courts, lawyer-represented people are on average 6.5 times more likely to 
win their cases than are unrepresented people in trial courts. In fields of 
average complexity in tribunals, lawyer-represented people are on average 
7.6 times more likely to win their cases than are unrepresented people. 
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Figure 3. Observed Difference in Outcomes for Attorney-Represented 
and Unrepresented People, by Forum Type and Procedural Complexity 
of the Field of Law Involved in the Case: Odds ratios 
 
 
The finding that the observed difference is larger when procedures are 
more complex suggests that part of what lawyers do to affect litigation 
outcomes may be assisting people in managing procedural complexity. Of 
course, we cannot know that procedural complexity is the only, or even the 
largest, factor creating the differences we observe. And, as I noted earlier, 
we cannot know how much of the observed difference is due to what 
lawyers are doing and how much is due to differences in the kinds of cases 
or litigants that end up having attorneys to represent them. And, of course, 
we would like to have many more studies on which to base such a 
conclusion. But the finding that procedural complexity bears a relationship 
to the size of the observed difference is very suggestive. 
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IV. ACCESS TO LAW AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
A. The Impact of Expanded Access to Counsel 
The finding that procedural complexity may account for at least a portion 
of lawyers’ impact on case outcomes provides some insight into how 
expanded access to counsel, whether through a “right” or other means, 
might affect the American public’s experience with its civil justice 
problems. Procedural complexity involves two distinct kinds of practical 
challenges for a lay litigant: figuring out what is specifically legal about 
one’s problems and figuring out how to pursue one’s problems using the 
formal legal system. Complexity likely raises the bar on both of these 
dimensions: greater complexity makes it more difficult for lay litigants to 
identify legally cognizable claims, and it further makes it difficult for lay 
people to pursue those claims through hearings, trials, and legal documents. 
Consider, as an example, a type of case that features in three of the 
studies in the meta-analysis: evictions. No national empirical picture of 
evictions exists, so we do not know how many evictions occur each year, 
nor do we know what most evictions are like. We do not know the typical 
issues of law raised in evictions around the country, nor do we know about 
the prevalence of different kinds of facts. For example, we do not know the 
usual reasons that landlords move for eviction. Nor do we know how many 
evictions involve fact situations that are favorable or unfavorable to one 
side or another, such as how many evictions for breach of lease involve 
actual breaches. One likely very common allegation in evictions is 
nonpayment of rent. One author suggests that “[p]erhaps the most common 
reason a landlord seeks a tenant’s removal is because the tenant has not paid 
the rent.”81 A recent study in San Mateo County, California, found that 
almost two-thirds (65 percent) of eviction filings alleged nonpayment of 
rent. This proportion may have been lower than in typical years, as the 
mortgage crisis contributed to many post-foreclosure evictions (27 percent 
of those filed).82 Because evictions for nonpayment of rent are apparently a 
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common—and perhaps the most common—type of eviction, I will take 
them as the exemplary case. 
Lay litigants may have poor skills when it comes to figuring out what 
their peculiarly legal problems are. For example, among people who face 
eviction for not paying their rent, some will, in fact, have not paid it. The 
reasons they did not pay their rent may be socially legitimate reasons, in 
that both the defaulting tenant and many other people would recognize them 
as legitimate excuses for not paying rent. For example, someone may have a 
child who is very ill and requires expensive medication. If this family has 
no health insurance, because they cannot afford it, they will have to pay out-
of-pocket for that medication. Given limited resources, they may have to 
choose between paying the rent and treating their child’s illness with costly 
drugs. Or, the car that someone relies on for traveling to a job that supports 
her family may need expensive repairs. She must repair the car to keep the 
job but, given limited resources, that may mean not paying the rent. Most of 
us would probably be in sympathy with a parent’s choice to pay for 
necessary medicines ahead of rent. Many of us would also sympathize with 
the parent who did what was necessary to keep her job even though that 
meant not fulfilling other obligations, such as paying rent as part of a rental 
contract. But neither of these defenses is typically legally cognizable. 
A tenant who had not paid the rent might still have some means of 
staving off the eviction. In some jurisdictions, the tenant might be able to 
get some or all of the unpaid rent rebated under an implied warranty of 
habitability, if the premises were deficient under housing codes.83 However, 
not all low-income housing is bad enough to justify rent rebates. Eviction 
requires that proper notice be served on the tenant. The notice of eviction 
might have been defective or improperly served.84 However, notices are not 
always incorrect or improperly served. In the absence of a habitability claim 
or a defective notice, the tenant in rent arrears has little legal leverage to 
counter the eviction.  
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How could an attorney assist in this hypothetical case—perhaps a very 
common one—where a poor person faces eviction for not paying rent that 
she, in fact, has not paid? An attorney could have the expertise to 
understand, explain, and collect the evidence for habitability violations. The 
attorney could also make that case for the tenant in court. An attorney could 
do similar tasks if the notice of eviction were defective. Even if the case 
involved good notice and safe and secure premises, an attorney could advise 
the tenant about the situation and the tenant’s options and try to help limit 
the collateral damage of being sued for eviction. The attorney could help the 
tenant file an answer, which would effectively stay the judgment until a trial 
date and give the tenant a few weeks in which to try to find new premises.85 
The tenant, with the attorney’s assistance, could also try to settle with the 
landlord without proceeding to trial. An attorney might also help the tenant 
get out of the apartment without an adverse judgment that would appear on 
his or her credit rating.86 
However, ironically, the attorney might be least useful in this situation 
when representing the tenant in court. Given the usual law and these 
hypothetical facts (unpaid rent, properly served notice, no habitability 
issues), if the tenant followed the eviction all the way through to trial, the 
outcome of adjudication could well be the same whether or not the tenant 
was represented by an attorney; the landlord would regain possession of the 
apartment, and the tenant would receive a judgment of eviction. 
This example highlights two ways that an expanded access to counsel 
might affect public experience with civil justice problems. First, the 
example suggests that greater access to attorneys could be a form of public 
legal education. Attorneys could give members of the public assistance in 
figuring out what their legal claims might be or, indeed, whether they have 
any legal claims at all. Many unjust, unfair, appalling, and regrettable 
events happen in the world; the legal system, for better or for worse, has 
remedies for only a few of them. Part of the impact of an expanded access 
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to counsel could be to better inform the public about the practical scope of 
the legal system. 
If this reasoning is correct, then an expanded access to counsel would 
increase the share of litigants who appeared in court with legally cognizable 
claims and defenses. Part of this change in the pool of adjudicated cases 
would occur because people with legally cognizable claims (who currently 
do not know how to identify those claims) would be able to make claims 
with the assistance of lawyers. At the same time, more cases with legal 
grounds would be appearing on dockets in part because greater access to 
attorneys would lead to fewer groundless cases in court. In some instances, 
lawyers might well advise potential litigants to forgo pursuing their claims 
through law and assist them in seeking out other solutions, like attempting 
to negotiate mutually acceptable resolutions with the other parties involved 
in their civil justice problems. 
Second, the example suggests that greater access to attorneys might lead 
to more legally accurate decisions on the part of adjudicators. The second 
aspect of complexity that I identified involved getting the problem through 
the formal legal process: filling out and filing legal forms, writing 
pleadings, making motions, presenting legal arguments, figuring out what is 
admissible as evidence, using that evidence appropriately and effectively, 
etc. Part of the reason that unrepresented litigants fare so poorly may be the 
sheer confusion created by all of the documents and procedures that are 
outside their usual experience. Studies investigating the experiences of lay 
people who appear unrepresented in courts and tribunals show that many 
have great difficulty translating their goals and experiences into legal terms, 
and that court staff are often not helpful to them. 87 The impact of expanded 
access to lawyers would likely be to increase the rates at which currently 
unrepresented people won their cases, because lawyers’ understanding of 
procedure would reveal meritorious claims that are currently buried under 
unrepresented litigants’ confusion about, and misunderstanding of, the 
formal legal process. In pools of cases where the people in these studies 
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typically face opponents who have lawyer representation, expanded access 
to lawyers for these people might also help to reduce the advantage 
currently enjoyed by their lawyered-up adversaries. 
Focusing narrowly on the small share of civil justice problems that ever 
become court cases, these findings suggest considerable scope for the 
impact of lawyers. It is not clear, though, that lawyers are necessary to 
achieve the impacts identified here—at least not for the types of ordinary 
litigation in fields of low to average complexity that have been investigated 
in the studies reviewed. Recall that the complexity that appears to trip up 
the lay public does not seem especially complex to lawyers. The studies in 
which we observe the largest differences between lawyer-represented and 
unrepresented people involve law that holds average complexity compared 
to the full scope of lawyers’ work. 
This average level of complexity might be manageable through other 
means than expanded access to attorneys. In some U.S. forums, nonlawyer 
advocates are already allowed to appear.88 My own research, and that of 
other scholars, suggests that these nonlawyer advocates, when trained and 
experienced, can be at least as effective as attorneys in assisting people in 
pursuing their claims in tribunals.89 Similarly, if complex procedures create 
barriers in access to justice, jurisdictions might tackle this problem directly 
by simplifying the procedures themselves, in favor of supplying 
representatives to assist lay people in navigating them.90 
All three of these solutions are quite traditional and have been repeatedly 
proposed for years: more access to lawyers,91 more access to nonlawyer 
advocates,92 and simplified procedures that would allow lay people to more 
easily use law to pursue resolution of their justice problems.93 What is 
traditional about all of these solutions is their focus on formal legal 
institutions as the universal response to justice problems. 
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B. Beyond Access to Law: Access to Justice 
1. Three Empirical Realities Ignored By the Traditional Focus on Law 
This traditional focus on law is, unfortunately, myopic.94 It ignores three 
empirical realities that should inspire us to new thinking about access to 
justice. The first reality is that Americans typically do not understand their 
civil justice problems as legal problems. Decades of research show not only 
that Americans usually do not turn to lawyers and courts with their justice 
problems,95 but also that law often does not even enter their thinking about 
these problems.96 Perhaps Americans act and think this way because law is 
not available; but, perhaps they would also prefer the opportunity to have 
access to other nonlegal sources of advice and assistance for these very 
common problems.  
In the United Kingdom (U.K.), another common law country, people 
appear quite happy to go to an established advice sector (staffed by 
nonlawyers) to gain information and advice for resolving their justice 
problems, often without taking formal legal action. People in the U.K. go to 
this advice sector even when lawyers’ services are heavily subsidized or 
free (as they are for more than two-fifths of the population).97 U.K. 
residents also enjoy another resource absent in the American context: a 
group of government ombudsmen’s offices, empowered to independently 
investigate and authoritatively resolve civil justice problems involving a 
variety of regulated industries, including common problems with insurers, 
pensions, banks, and the like.98 
Whether lawyers and courts are the proper solution to a justice problem 
depends on what one’s goals are, and the traditional U.S. approach to legal 
aid assumes the goal is more law. But, in fact, we know very little about the 
American public’s goals with respect to their own justice problems. U.S. 
civil justice surveys do not ask people what they would have liked to do 
about their justice problems, but rather about whether or not they consulted 
a lawyer for those problems. Instead of a day in court, what members of the 
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public may often want is simply to have their problems resolved or their 
options explained to them. The U.K. experience reviewed above suggests 
that lawyers and courts are not always necessary for resolution and 
explanation. Conceptually, empirically, and in policy, we should be 
considering a much wider range of sources of resolution, rather than forcing 
a single vision on a very diverse public experiencing a wide variety of 
justice problems. 
The second reality is that when poor people in the United States do have 
access to law, they seldom receive complex legal services. One can see this 
pattern in the LSC’s reports of the services that its grantees provide. Most 
of the LSC’s civil legal services provided to poor people do not involve 
representation in court. In 2008, most cases taken by the LSC (60.3 percent) 
were closed with “counsel and advice,” which includes services such as “the 
advocate ascertain[ing] and review[ing] relevant facts, exercise[ing] 
judgment in interpreting the particular facts presented by the client and in 
applying the relevant law to the facts presented, and counsel[ing] the client 
concerning his or her legal problem.”99 Another 18.7 percent of cases were 
closed with “limited action,” which includes actions like “communication 
by letter, telephone or other means to a third party” and “preparation of a 
simple legal document such as a routine will or power of attorney.”100  
A minority of closed cases received representation in some kind of court 
case or hearing, though it is not possible to determine precisely how many, 
given the way the LSC collects case reporting data. Contested court 
decisions and appeals combined closed 3.7 percent of cases;101 4.6 percent 
of cases were closed by “settlement with litigation.”102 Agency decisions 
closed 3.2 percent of cases, and 2.4 percent of cases received “extensive 
services,” which can include “extensive ongoing assistance to clients who 
are proceeding pro se.”103 So, something less than 20 percent of the cases 
served by the LSC-involved lawyers appearing on behalf of clients in courts 
or hearings. The pattern of services, which heavily favors information, 
advice, and basic assistance over representation, in part reflects legal aid 
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agencies’ strategic decisions about how to effectively use scarce 
resources.104 But it is also, in part, a reflection of what many people may 
typically need with respect to common justice problems, as illustrated in the 
eviction example above. We might consider whether it is actually necessary 
that lawyers per se provide these basic legal services. 
The third problem with the field’s narrow focus on the formal legal 
institutions of lawyers and courts is that it presumes a questionably feasible 
solution to an empirically enormous problem. In 2008, LSC-funded 
programs closed something fewer than nine hundred thousand cases,105 
receiving total funding from all sources that amounted to about $990 per 
closed case.106 Recall that by a conservative estimate, more than twenty-five 
million LSC-eligible people are living in households already affected by at 
least one justice problem. No one knows precisely how much is spent to 
subsidize access to civil justice in the United States, but one observer puts 
this figure at around one billion dollars each year.107 To expand the basic 
levels of services currently provided to serve every LSC-eligible client with 
a civil justice problem, how much more funding would we need? Lawyers 
are expensive. A recent estimate suggests that providing one additional hour 
of lawyers’ services to the existing justice problem for each household 
would require “a twenty-fold increase in current U.S. levels of public and 
private (charitable) legal aid funding.”108 Twenty billion dollars is small 
change in the context of $3.6 trillion or so in total federal spending and a 
gross domestic product of $14.6 trillion.109 However, it is a massive 
increase in the context of current levels of funding for access to civil justice. 
More access to law is part of the answer, but only part. 
Expanding access to nonlegal institutions of remedy for civil justice 
problems is an innovative solution that responds to all three of these 
empirical realities—the fact that Americans often do not think of their 
justice problems as legal; the fact that many could benefit from services that 
could be provided by nonlawyers and; the high cost of lawyers’ services as 
they are currently produced. Nonlegal institutions of remedy provide 
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advice, information, and authoritative resolution of civil justice problems, 
but “without requiring public contact with courts, tribunals, lawsuits, 
litigation or lawyers.”110 A robust and effective set of nonlegal institutions 
would include both a component that is “empowered to produce 
authoritative resolution to the public’s civil justice problems”111 and a set of 
auxiliaries that “work apart from formal institutions of remedy by providing 
problem-resolution strategies that, although not authoritative, may 
nevertheless be very effective from the public’s perspective.”112 
2. Twin Pillars for New Nonlegal Institutions of Remedy 
These new nonlegal institutions of remedy would rest on two pillars. The 
first would be a nationally present, nonlawyer advice sector that centers its 
work around substantive problems that people commonly confront. As in 
the U.K., these advisors should be empowered to give legal advice. Their 
advice would not be limited to legal routes to obtain solutions; rather, it 
would be focused on helping people understand their options and resolve 
their substantive problems. Such services could provide many Americans 
with the information and assistance they need to resolve many of the kinds 
of justice problems they face today, often without recourse to formal law. 
These advice services might be public or charitable, but we also might 
consider market-based models for the provision of nonlawyer advice. In any 
event, implementing this policy would, of course, require relaxing lawyers’ 
monopoly on the provision of legal advice, as has been advocated by 
others.113 
The second pillar of the new U.S. nonlegal institutions of remedy would 
be authoritative nonlegal routes to the resolution of justice problems. One of 
the most promising forms of such institutions is government ombudsmen’s 
offices. Ombudsmen’s offices are empowered to independently investigate 
and authoritatively resolve complaints by the public about vendors in the 
industries that they oversee.114 As the U.K.’s Financial Ombudsman Service 
puts it, “these offices are ‘the official independent expert[s] in settling . . . 
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complaints, with the power to put things right.”115 As noted above, my own 
research shows that, in contexts where such nonlegal solutions are 
available, people use them, doing so even when publicly subsidized 
attorney services are also available.116 In the contemporary United States, 
perhaps the most prominent regulated industries appearing in the public’s 
civil justice problems are financial services and health care, including health 
insurance.117 In addition to the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
czar,118 we should seriously consider a Consumer Financial Protection 
Ombudsman. A similar office could be created to resolve consumers’ 
problems with health insurance providers. These problems are frequent 
now, but likely will become much more common as many more people will 
soon have health insurance; the recent health care reform bill will expand 
the population covered by both public and private insurers by thirty million 
people.119 
CONCLUSION 
Many millions of people in this country face civil justice problems that 
can and often do have far-reaching effects on their lives. More than fifty 
million people are currently eligible for LSC-funded civil legal aid. The 
best available evidence suggests that at least half of them are living in 
households facing at least one civil justice problem. Even though most of 
these problems never make it to courts, tribunals, or attorneys’ offices, the 
existing legal aid resources of the country are overstretched by any measure. 
The tens of millions of people facing civil justice problems and eligible 
under current means tests for aid have access to perhaps one full-time civil 
legal assistance attorney for every five thousand people eligible for that 
attorney’s services—and that is if one includes as sources of civil legal 
assistance not just LSC-funded legal aid, but also legal aid lawyers salaried 
from other sources and lawyers working in organized civil pro bono 
programs.120 Given these facts, it is no surprise that, in recent studies of its 
own offices’ capacity to serve, the LSC found that these offices must turn 
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away for lack of resources at least as many people as they are able to 
help.121 
The seemingly overwhelming nature of the present problem constitutes a 
necessity that can spur innovation, both in how we think about access to 
civil justice and in what we do about it. Choosing what solutions to employ 
in any given reform should be substantially an empirical question—that is, 
we should use empirical evidence to guide us in deciding when simplifying 
procedures would be an adequate solution, when a nonlawyer advocate or 
legal advice from a nonlawyer advisor would be sufficient, or when 
situations need fully qualified attorneys. We certainly do not yet have the 
evidence base we need to make these kinds of determinations. The 
significant deficits in our understanding should be an impetus to get 
working. 
But choosing between solutions cannot be a completely empirical 
question. We first have to decide on what goals we want these solutions to 
achieve. The people bearing the greatest weight of the current failures of 
our institutions of remedy for civil justice problems are the public. They 
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